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Tables	
Table 1. Explanations of party support for the European Parliament 
Model 1  2 3 4 5 
Year of cross-section 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Liberal-conservative (gal-tan) -0.2 (0.03)*   -0.2 (0.04)* -0.06 (0.02)* -0.3 (0.04)* 
Left-right dimension (economic)   0.01 (0.04) 0.1 (0.04)* -0.07 (0.02)* 0.1 (0.04)* 
Party support for European integration       0.6 (0.04)*   
Country dummy variables         Yes 
Constant 6.0 (0.2)* 4.9 (0.3)* 5.6 (0.3)* 2.7 (0.2)* 5.7 (0.5)* 
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 
r-square 0.2 0.0008 0.2 0.7 0.5 
Note: ° p<.1, * p<.05. Models 1-4 are OLS estimations with robust, country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Model 
5 has robust standard errors and includes country-dummy variables. Earlier cross-sections are in the Appendix (Table A2). 
Table 2. Determinants of national parliamentary oversight institutions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Support for the EP -0.2 (0.1)* -0.2 (0.1)* -0.2 (0.1)* -0.2 (0.1)* -0.2 (0.1)° -0.02 (0.01)* 
Treaty phase   0.2 (0.04)* 0.1 (0.04)* 0.1 (0.04)* 0.1 (0.04)* 0.006 (0.01) 
Euroscepticism     0.005 (0.003)° 0.005 (0.003)° 0.006 (0.003)° -0.0002 (0.0003) 
Committee strength       0.07 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)* 0.004 (0.002) 
Support for integration         0.02 (0.1)   
Lagged dependent 
variable 
          0.9 (0.02)* 
Constant 2.2 (0.4)* 1.9 (0.4)* 2.0 (0.4)* 1.7 (0.4)* 1.6 (0.4)* 0.1 (0.1)* 
Observations 223 223 223 218 218 211 
r-square 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 1 
Note: ° p<.1, * p<.05. The models are OLS estimations with robust, country-clustered standard errors. 
 
 
